By Rajan Kumar
As Russian battle tanks, missiles and drones wreak havoc in Ukraine, the questions on everyone’s mind are what is the endgame and where will Putin stop? Making a forecast about Russia is often a risky proposition. Academics and experts have routinely failed in making accurate predictions about Russia – be it the disintegration of the USSR (1991), the Russian intervention in Georgia (2008), the annexation of Crimea (2014) or the intervention in Syria (2015). And now with the invasion of Ukraine, a new puzzle has emerged. What is President Putin’s grand strategy? Scholars put forward three hypotheses. A maximalist one argues that imperial Russia is headed to restore the USSR by collecting core territories that it lost in 1991. A second, and a moderate one, holds that once the objective of regime change in Kiev is achieved, the Russian army will withdraw. And the third one contends that President Putin wants to stop NATO from expanding eastwards.
The first hypothesis that Putin wants to redraw the map of Russia and annex the territories of post-Soviet states is widely popular in the West. His annexation of Crimea, the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states, and the invasion of Ukraine have lent credibility to this argument. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, when asked in a CNN interview whether Putin seeks to restore the USSR, replied, ‘I think that’s one of President Putin’s objectives, and it is to re-exert a sphere of influence over countries that previously were part of the Soviet Union’. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania genuinely believe that Putin has a larger goal of re-incorporating lost Soviet territories and restoring past glory. They are alarmed at the developments in Ukraine. They fear that if Kiev falls to Russia, Putin will turn to the Baltic States next. Estonia and Latvia have sizable Russian minorities. Lithuania’s President Gitanas Nauseda has warned Washington that Putin will not stop in Ukraine.
Proponents of this thesis are convinced that Putin seeks to re-create Tsarist Russia or the USSR 2.0. For them, Putin is working assiduously to destroy the liberal international order, dismantle Western democracies, create a rift between the US and Europe, and reconfigure geopolitical alignment with China and other autocracies. Normatively, the conflict between the West and Russia is projected as a struggle between democracies and autocracies and between the rule of law and jungle-raj.
The second hypothesis holds that Putin’s primary goal is to seize Kiev, force the government of Volodymyr Zelensky to surrender or exit, and install a pliable pro-Russian regime. It would be something similar to the regime of Yanukovich that existed prior to the 2014 Euromaidan protests. Putin’s ‘special military operation’ aims to achieve the twin objectives of ‘demilitarisation and denazification’. Moscow defines demilitarisation as crushing the military infrastructure and defence capacity of Ukraine. Denazification refers to forcing the hyper-nationalist regime of Zelensky to surrender and punishing those responsible for committing atrocities against the Russian population. The Kremlin considers Zelensky a West-sponsored puppet who lacks legitimacy and works as a conduit to facilitate NATO’s containment of Russia. Zelensky’s regime is viewed as neo-Nazist, which spreads hatred against Russians. This rhetoric is intended to counter western propaganda and delegitimise Zelensky’s regime. It does not convince Moscow that Zelensky himself is of Jewish parentage, whose grandparents fought against the Nazis in the Soviet Red Army.
The third hypothesis, popular in Russia, contends that President Putin’s primary motive is to halt the eastward expansion of NATO. Before the onset of the invasion, Russia had put forward three main demands before the West: first, there should be no eastward expansion of NATO, second, NATO will not deploy offensive weapons in countries bordering Russia, and third, it should withdraw troops deployed in countries that entered the alliance after 1997. These were maximalist demands open for compromise and moderation during negotiations. Russia would have agreed to a settlement if the West guaranteed Ukraine’s neutrality formally or informally. For the Biden administration, acceding to such a demand would have implied a second capitulation soon after the debacle in Afghanistan. The Kremlin was frustrated with the deadlocks in negotiations, and it decided to take a decisive step to secure its borders.
Of the three hypotheses outlined above, the most plausible ones are halting the eastward expansion of NATO and installing a favourable regime in Kiev. Unlike the West, Russia does not have the economic resources and civil society instruments to execute a regime change in another country. It did what it is good at − sending in its military and forcing the adversary to capitulate.
In contrast to the risk-averse Western behaviour, Russia is often risk-taking and reckless. The Russian intervention in Syria and its annexation of Crimea are testimony to this fact. Moscow was confident that the war-weary American people would not approve boots on the ground to defend Ukraine. Time was opportune following America’s withdrawal of its army from Afghanistan. Therefore, Putin decided to teach Ukraine a lesson and redraw the map of Europe.
In all likelihood, the Russian army will withdraw if Putin succeeds in installing a favourable regime in Kiev. Moscow has not yet deployed its elite forces and sophisticated air power to destroy the Ukrainian military. It has also allowed Ukraine to operate its air power. Its strategy is to block NATO”s access from the Black Sea region and seize key Ukrainian cities by invading it from three sides. It appears that Moscow did not expect as much resistance from the Ukrainian army and people as was put up. It also probably miscalculated the cost of sanctions imposed by the West.
Western sanctions have raised the cost of the war for Putin. He is unlikely to retreat without achieving the critical objective of a regime change in Kiev. If the war lingers, the cost in terms of human life and property would be unbearable for both Ukraine and the rest of the world. It is an asymmetrical war between one of the most powerful armies in the world and a highly motivated but weak military. Ordinary people in Ukraine, caught between the rivalry of two powers, are suffering for no fault of theirs. Europe is in the middle of a massive humanitarian crisis, something it has not witnessed since World War II. Europe did not expect this aggression from Moscow, and its worst nightmare is coming true. The security equilibrium that existed in Europe seems to have been disrupted by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
To be sure, Russia lacks ideological, financial or military resources to re-create the USSR. President Putin is aware of Russia’s limitations. The world today is far removed from the one that existed during the years of the Cold War. A new superpower is in waiting, and several regional hegemons are vying for global influence. Their regional influence will thwart any move by Russia to recreate the USSR. Therefore, Putin’s key objective is confined to keeping Ukraine and Belarus in its sphere of influence.
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus constitute the core of Slavic identity, the cradle of Russian civilisation. A common contract has often defined the nature of Slavic states. In this context, one remembers the secret Belavezha Accords of 1991 signed by these states, which declared that ‘the USSR, as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality, is ceasing to exist’. Without this agreement, the disintegration of the USSR would have been murkier and more chaotic. Boris Yeltsin was the leader of Russia during that time. His chosen successor, Vladimir Putin, seeks to revise that contract and add a modifier clause that “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia”.
There is no definite answer to the primary question of where Russia will stop. Putin’s strategy has evolved over time. Before the onset of the war, the Kremlin could have settled for some notional autonomy to the Donbas region and a guarantee that NATO will not include Ukraine in the short term. But with new developments, Russia is likely to insist on Ukraine’s recognition of Crimea as part of Russia and independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. Neutrality of Ukraine will also be underlined.
The cost of the war has risen considerably for Russia. President Putin will have to demonstrate considerable security gains to counter the material loss that Russia will incur due to its economic, political and psychological isolation by the West. The stakes are so high that any loss would put a question mark on Putin’s credibility and leadership. The Kremlin might have misread the potential resistance on ground or it might be an outcome of presidential hubris, but the die has been cast, and a retreat sans substantial gain is not an option for Russia.
(The author Kumar teaches in School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His book ‘Re-emerging Russia: Structure, Institutions and Processes’ (co-authored) was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2017. Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited).
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